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I. Introduction
In 1804, in a case entitled Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,
Chief Justice John Marshall held that "an act of [C]ongress ought
never be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains."' Almost a century later, writing for
a majority of the Court in The Paquete Habana case, Justice Gray held
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination." 2 Such decisions would seem to carve out a
defined place for international law in United States jurisprudence.
Yet today, another century beyond the holding of The Paquete
Habana, trenchant questions are posed regarding the appropriate
1. 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
2. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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role of international law in the domestic legal order.3  Both
commentators and judicial opinions give cause to wonder if the
language of these past opinions retains resonance or if they are now
merely the antique echoes of more idealistic age, rendered devoid of
meaning in modern times.4
This Article explores the role of international law in U.S.
domestic law vis-a-vis the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction -
an area of law that marks the intersection between domestic law and
international affairs. The analysis which follows demonstrates the
continued force of international law in the body of U.S. domestic
law which governs this realm and highlights both the advantages
and dangers attendant to the reliance upon international law by
courts engaged in this complex yet increasingly salient area of the
law. Moreover, a review of U.S. jurisprudence relating to the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law reveals a sharp dichotomy
between the rules articulated for regulatory crime and those
prescribed for other sorts of transnational criminal activity. This
dichotomy in U.S. jurisprudence with regard to laws that impact
commercial markets and criminal matters that do not have such
market-impacting qualities is both a logical and supportable
rationale due to the different nature of such laws and their
respective purposes.
The role of international law in each analysis will also differ,
depending on the nature of the matter under consideration. For
instance, in regulatory matters, U.S. courts will base limitations on
extraterritorial jurisdiction on notions of comity while, for
transnational criminal matters, courts will apply limitations mostly
commonly associated with the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, but suffused with international legal considerations.
An analysis of each varied approach in U.S. jurisprudence
illuminates key areas where international law and U.S. domestic law
converge, specifically with regard to the manner in which each
empowers or limits the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law.
II. International Law in the Domestic Legal Order
Commentators note that the relationship between international
3. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 526 (1998).
4. Id.
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law and domestic national law can be aptly "characterized in terms
of coordination between formally autonomous, but in practice
highly interdependent, legal orders."s With the dramatic rise in the
frequency and scope of transnational criminal activity and the
modern phenomenon of globalization, the interrelationship of these
two legal orders has come into sharper focus. From issues relating
to international terrorism to more banal matters with distinct
international dimensions, national courts in the modern era find
themselves deciding cases with significant international elements
and which have the potential to impact relations between sovereigns
on the international plane. One area which is implicated across a
broad range of legal topics and which has a natural propensity to
affect international relations is the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 6 This is due to the inherently conflict-generative nature
of extraterritoriality. As one author notes:
[E]xtraterritorial punishment has also been considered
inconsistent with, or at least problematic under, the light of the
principle of state sovereignty. The world is divided into political
entities with an exclusive right to regulate the conduct of
individuals within their territorial borders. A crucial normative
difficulty with extraterritorial jurisdiction is, then, that it is not
claimed exclusively on the high seas, or Antarctica for that matter,
but rather on the territory of another sovereign state. 7
Moreover, as Nollkaemper notes, "[t]he rule of law at the
national level does not provide an adequate framework for the
control of public power as it relates to such transnational issues
as ... protection of fundamental rights, health, and security."8
When confronted with such matters, national courts are thus left
with the Herculean task of addressing transnational legal issues,
which national legal systems cannot alone regulate, and under
5. ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF
LAW 13 (2011).
6. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11,
2006, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), Annex E,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 ("The notion of extraterritoriality may be
understood in relation to a State as encompassing the area beyond its territory,
including its land, internal waters, territorial sea as well as the adjacent airspace.")
[hereinafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction], available at http://www.tjsl.edu/
slomansonb/ 5.1_UNExtra.pdf.
7. ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ExTRA-
TERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT 20 (2010).
8. See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 5, at 2.
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certain circumstances which can provide fertile ground for conflict.9
In such instances, a court may find it more appropriate to demure -
to refuse to enter into the fray by finding a limitation on its ability to
extend its jurisdictional reach to the matter under consideration.
Such demurrals serve to decrease the potential for international
conflict but at the cost of sovereign power.
In grappling with this need to address transnational issues in
the context of a national legal system, domestic courts have
increasingly looked to international legal principles, resulting in a
level of "penetration of international law in the national legal
order[."T1 This Article explores the degree to which international
law has permeated U.S. jurisprudence governing the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational criminal activity and
the degree to which international law has been used by U.S. courts
to limit or empower extraterritorial jurisdiction. Specific focus is
given to the interrelationship between the limits imposed by
international law, such as the "rule of reasonableness," and due
process limitations imposed by U.S. courts.
In reviewing a broad spectrum of U.S. judicial decisions, this
Article demonstrates that the justifications for and against the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S jurisprudence are
multifarious, revealing distinct analytical strata that are dependent
upon the nature of the law being applied extraterritorially and the
conduct regulated. For instance, regulatory laws impacting
commercial markets have been made the subject of an analysis that
is distinct from analysis applied to other forms of transnational
criminal activity." Moreover, due to a split in U.S. jurisprudence,
the analysis applied to that latter group of transnational crimes
(those that do not impact international commercial markets), will
further depend upon the judicial district. In that regard, analysis of
lower courts roughly falls into one of two categories: (1) districts
9. See Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 2 ("The assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State is an attempt to regulate by means of national
legislation, adjudication or enforcement the conduct of persons, property or acts
beyond its borders which affect the interests of the State in the absence of such
regulation under international law. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a
State tends to be more common with respect to particular fields of national law in
view of the persons, property or acts outside its territory which are more likely to
affect its interests, notably criminal law and commercial law.").
10. See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 5, at 9.
11. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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which require a nexus between the defendant and the United States
in order to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (2) districts
which only require that the exercise of jurisdiction not be arbitrary
or unfair. The particular role of international law in each of these
analyses varies along with the sorts of limitations imposed upon the
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.
III. Jurisdiction and the International Legal Order
Jurisdiction, defined as "the right to prescribe and enforce rules
against others," 12 is a core element of state power. The ability to
wield authority over a certain class of individuals, described by one
commentator as "the quintessence of sovereignty," 13 is fundamental
to the idea of a governing authority that is capable of exercising
power over its territory.14 The exercise of jurisdiction by a state is
typically conceived of taking one of three forms: jurisdiction to
prescribe (to enact law), jurisdiction to adjudicate (to subject persons
or entities to its law), and jurisdiction to enforce (to compel
compliance with its law).15 The focus of this Article is prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction in the context of criminal law - the
enactment of laws creating a criminal offense and the concomitant
adjudication of the offenders made the subject of those laws.
It is the primal aspect of jurisdiction - its close association with
sovereign authority - which also infuses it with such conflict-
generative potential. A cursory search of contemporary headlines
provides ample evidence of how the exercise of jurisdiction can
dramatically impact foreign affairs and give rise to potential conflict.
A notable example is the case of Yunus Rahmatullah, a citizen of
Pakistan who was captured in Iraq by British forces in 2004 before
being transferred to the United States and then moved from Iraq to
Bagram in Afghanistan.16 Rahmatullah, though imprisoned in
Afghanistan, brought his case before domestic courts in the United
12. VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2007).
13. ANTONIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (2d ed. 2005).
14. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 50 (2d ed. 1997) ("This vertical structure
composed of sovereign and subjects is, according to the theory, as essential a part of
a society which possesses law, as a backbone is of a man.").
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
16. Ramhmatullah v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,
[2011] EWCA (Civ) 1540, [3].
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Kingdom and eventually appealed to the Court of Appeal (Civil
Division) in the United Kingdom for a writ of habeas corpus. The
U.K. court, after considering the issue, held that a Pakistani man
who was captured by British forces but held by the U.S. military in
Afghanistan may pursue a habeas corpus petition against the U.K.
Secretary of State for Defence and for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs.17 In so holding, the U.K. Court of Appeal ordered the
executive branch of the United Kingdom to secure the release of
Rahmatullah who was held by the United States. This, in turn,
placed the government of the United Kingdom in the odd position
of having to approach the United States to ask for the release of this
prisoner so that it could comply with a judicial decision by U.K.
domestic court. As such, one sovereign was compelled to oppose
the obvious desire of another - even though the facts of the case
suggest that foreign policy considerations (at least at one point)
compelled the United Kingdom to support the individual's
detention by the United States.
Similarly, in 2005, a Spanish judge issued an international arrest
order for three U.S. soldiers based upon their involvement in the
death of a Spanish journalist in Iraq who was killed when an
American tank fired at his hotel in Baghdad in 2003.18 U.S. officials
denied that the soldiers acted improperly and, to the contrary,
expressly found that they were justified in firing at the hotel because
they had reason to believe it was an enemy position. A Spanish
Judge, nonetheless, believed that certain evidence suggested the
soldiers might have committed murder and a "crime against the
international community" by firing at the hotel.19 The Spanish judge
eventually indicted the U.S. soldiers, but the U.S. government
refused to hand them over to Spain.20 Accordingly, a Spanish
judge's exercise of jurisdiction over a transnational criminal issue
placed two sovereigns in antagonistic positions.
As these examples indicate, a domestic court's decision to
exercise jurisdiction is capable of having a profound impact on
17. Id. at [33]-[34].
18. Renwick McLean, 3 U.S. soldiers face arrest in Spain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/19/world/europe/19iht-spain.html.
19. Id.
20. Victoria Burnett, Spanish judge indicts 3 U.S. soldiers in connection with
journalist's death, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2 0 0 7 /04/
27/world/ europe/ 27iht-spain.4.5474901.html.
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international affairs and relations between sovereigns. 21
International affairs, in turn, are regulated by international law - the
legal order that serves as the framework for cooperation between
nation states.22 It is therefore unsurprising to see domestic courts
look to international law when making decisions that implicate
international affairs and incorporate relevant international legal
principles into their decisionmaking.
IV. International Law and the Recognized Bases of
Jurisdiction
While the normal ambit of prescriptive jurisdiction is "the
territory over which a State is sovereign," 23 states may also, in
certain circumstances, enact legislation that criminalizes conduct
occurring outside of their territory.24 As noted, such assertions of
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction are inevitably a more
precarious venture as they generally involve both the interests of
another sovereign and a projection of state power of particular
significance. 25  Accordingly, as a matter of international law,
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is only considered to be a
legitimate exercise of state power when exercised in conformance
with one or more internationally recognized bases for the assertion
of jurisdiction. On that score, while domestic legal systems typically
have developed systems and rules demarcating the authorities and
limits of a court's jurisdiction, international law has not yet
developed a framework relating to the exercise of jurisdiction or the
21. See generally Eric Talbot Jensen & Chris Jenks, All Human Rights Are Equal,
But Some Are More Equal Than Others: The Extraordinary Rendition of a Terror Suspect
in Italy, the NATO SOFA, and Human Rights, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 171 (2010)
(explaining that an Italian court found a group of Italian military intelligence
agents, operatives from the Central Intelligence Agency and a U.S. Air Force
(USAF) officer guilty of the 2003 kidnapping of terror suspect Abu Omar).
22. See LOWE, supra note 12, at 1.
23. See CASSESE, supra note 13, at 49.
24. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, Wings for Talons: The Case
for the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Sexual Exploitation of Children through
Cyberspace, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 109 (2004); Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall,
The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO.
WASH. INTL L. REV. 1 (2007).
25. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 22 (2010) (noting, "[t]he assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a
person is amongst the most coercive activities any society can undertake.").
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apportionment of such national power between sovereigns.26
Customary international law, however, has developed to an extent
that the exercise of jurisdiction in certain forms can be identified as
permissible or otherwise.
The basic framework for the international law of jurisdiction
begins with the S.S. Lotus case, which was decided in 1927 by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (the League of Nations
forerunner to the current International Court of Justice). 27 In that
decision, the Permanent Court of International Justice articulated
the fundamental rule that prescriptive jurisdiction - the ability of a
government to prescribe law relating to certain activity28 - is
permissive in international law and, unless a prohibition to
prescriptive jurisdiction is proved, a state may properly claim
jurisdiction. 29
International law governs relations between independent States.
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order
to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be
presumed.30
The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed the enduring
force of this rule as recently as 2010, noting that the rule articulated
in Lotus remains a cornerstone of the international law of
jurisdiction. 31 As such, the starting point for any jurisdictional
analysis is a presumption of permissibility - a presumption that is
only overcome by demonstrating that the action is otherwise
prohibited by treaty or customary international law.32
26. LINDA CARTER ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW 7 (2007).
27. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
28. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2008).
29. See S.S. Lotus, 1 44.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Written Contribution of the Republic of Kosovo Concerning
Request of United Nations General Assembly for Advisory Opinion on Accordance
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Kosovo Advisory Opinion,
2010 I.C.J. (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/
15678.pdf.
32. Id. at 138 (noting "[f]rom the Lotus case to the present, the Court's
jurisprudence indicates that when assessing the international legality of a contested
2012] 331
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It is generally accepted that there are five recognized bases of
jurisdiction over transnational crime.33 These are the territorial
principle, the protective principle, nationality, passive personality,
and universal jurisdiction.34  The first of these, the territorial
principle, is the least controversial basis of jurisdiction.35  The
territorial principle is a theory of jurisdiction based upon a nexus
with the territory of the sovereign and grounded in a sovereign's
"right to legislate for all persons within its territory." 36  Such
jurisdictional power aligns with the basic framework of the
international order, in which territorial units comprise the basis for
organization.37 A state, accordingly, may exercise jurisdiction based
on a theory of subjective territoriality (an exercise of jurisdiction
over a crime which occurs in its territory), or a state may exercise
jurisdiction based on objective territoriality (an exercise of
jurisdiction over a crime that "originates abroad or is completed
elsewhere, so long as at least one of the elements of the offense
occurs in its territory").38 Although it is, in many ways, "[t]he most
obvious basis upon which a state exercises its jurisdiction,"39 it also
has its limitations.
Despite the resistance to excessive jurisdictional claims, there is a
general recognition that territorial jurisdiction is an inadequate
basis for regulating problems of the modern world such as
international crime, terrorism, cartelization, and pollution.40
Jurisdiction based on territory, accordingly, is a basic concept in
the law of international jurisdiction but, like states themselves, is an
inadequate tool for addressing contemporary issues of global
significance.41
action, the starting point is a presumption of permissibility, overcome only if it can
be shown that the action is prohibited by treaty or customary international law.").
33. CARTER ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.
34. Id.
35. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 46.
36. See LOWE, supra note 12, at 172.
37. Id. at 9.
38. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 46.
39. See LOWE, supra note 12, at 172.
40. Id. at 180.
41. See DOUGLAS HURD, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 6 (1997) (" [Nlation states are ...
incompetent. Not one of them, even the United States as the single remaining
super power, can adequately provide for the needs that its citizens now
articulate.").
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Another accepted basis for jurisdiction under customary
international law is the nationality principle. Sometimes called
"active nationality," this theory of jurisdiction permits states to
exercise jurisdiction over their nationals who commit crimes
abroad.42 This generally accepted principle of jurisdiction is based
on numerous considerations, such as a state's need to prevent its
nationals from engaging in criminal activity, to prevent its nationals
"from enjoying scandalous impunity,"43 difficulty locating the place
where an offense was committed, and the need of a state to protect
its international reputation. 44 Jurisdiction based on nationality also
has deep historico-legal roots, reaching far back to ancient times
when law had an ethnic quality and, in what is termed the
"personality of laws," each person was judged according to the law
of his or her ethnic group.45
The passive personality principle, in turn, is a theory of
jurisdiction under which states assert jurisdiction over a crime
committed against one of their nationals abroad.46 This basis of
jurisdiction has been historically considered somewhat controversial
and criticized as an exorbitant jurisdictional claim. 47  Cedric
Ryngaert, a lecturer in public international law at the University of
Utrecht in The Netherlands and the author of an authoritative text
on international jurisdiction, notes that "[i]t is unclear whether the
nationality of the victim, which certainly constitutes a legitimate
interest of the State, also constitutes a sufficient jurisdictional link
under international law." 48 Nonetheless, commentators note that
recent state practice indicates a growing acceptance of this practice
"at least for certain crimes, often linked to international terrorism." 49
This trend is discernible in the 1963 Convention on Offenses and
Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft which allows states
whose nationals have been harmed to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over the offenders. Similarly, the 2000 Transnational Organized
42. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47.
43. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 90.
44. Id.
45. See JEAN-MARIE CARBASSE, MANUEL D'INTRODUCTION HISTORIQUE AU DROIT 94-
96 (2002).
46. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 49.
47. See RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 94.
48. Id. at 92.
49. Id. at 94.
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Crime Convention, in the context of transnational crimes which are
the subject of that multilateral instrument, allows states to exercise
jurisdiction over individuals who harm their nationals.
50
The protective principle is a basis for jurisdiction under which a
state exercises jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that
threatens state security "such as the selling of State secrets, spying
or the counterfeiting of its currency or official seal." 51 Under this
principle, a state may assert jurisdiction over "acts perpetrated
abroad which jeopardize its sovereignty or its right to political
independence." 52
Finally, universal jurisdiction, noted as being among the most
controversial bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, is a theory of
jurisdiction that allows the exercise of jurisdiction over an offense
without regard to any nexus with the territory or national interests
of the sovereign - it is an exercise of jurisdiction over a crime
"without reference to the place of perpetration, the nationality of the
suspect or victim or any other recognized linking point between the
crime and the prosecuting State."53 This principle of jurisdiction,
described as both important and controversial,5 4 is increasingly
legitimated through state practice and is noted as a key tool in
seeking redress and providing justice for victims of gross human
rights violations.55
These traditionally recognized bases for the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, which are also
listed in Section 402 of the Restatement,56 are frequently referenced
in U.S. jurisprudence and relied upon by courts seeking to assert a
proper basis of jurisdiction. Their increasingly common appearance
in U.S. jurisprudence elucidates the deepening interrelationship
between domestic and international legal orders.
50. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW NORMs, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 379 (2006).
51. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50.
52. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 96.
53. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50-51.
54. Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDCTION 1 (2003).
55. Id.
56. RESTATEMENT § 402.
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V. Limitations on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
International Law
Although the bulk of the international law of jurisdiction
focuses on what bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction are permissible,
another focus of courts and commentators has been the bases for
limiting the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction - even when that
jurisdiction is otherwise permitted by one of the bases outlined
above. The two most prominent of such limitations are the ancient
principle of "comity" and the relatively recent "rule of
reasonableness."
A. Comity
One way in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited is
through the doctrine of judicial restraint known as comity. The
notion of comity has been an idea in flux from a legal perspective. It
began in nineteenth-century U.S. jurisprudence "as an assertion of
the primacy of the forum's own law" but evolved in its juridical
understanding into "an obligation to apply foreign law."5 7
Thereafter, in Cold War era jurisprudence, the idea of comity
became understood as "a justification for limiting domestic
jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, or enforce."58 It is frequently
characterized today as
a traditional diplomatic and international law concept used by
States in their dealings with each other. Short of legal obligation,
States respect each other's policy choices and interests in a given
case without inquiring into the substance of each other's laws.
Comity is widely believed to occupy a place between custom and
customary international law. 59
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the notion of deferring
to a state to respect its choices is based on a degree of recognition for
the laws and status of another nation.60 As one commentator notes,
"[r]oughly speaking, courts, according to this doctrine, should apply
foreign law or limit domestic jurisdiction out of respect for foreign
57. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 19, 38 (2008).
58. Id.
59. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 136-37.
60. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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sovereignty." 61 Sovereignty, in turn, is a foundational principle of
the international order. Its legal corollary, the principle of
nonintervention, serves as a buttress of this foundational principle
by prohibiting actions that undermine sovereignty.62 The ideas are
irrevocably intertwined as the latter implies the inviolability of the
former. As Max Huber, arbiter in the Island of Palmas case wrote,
"[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is
the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the
functions of a State." 63 The system of organization of states upon
which international relations are based depends upon these basic
tenets to ensure stability in world affairs.
This is also reflected in the U.N. General Assembly's
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation states that "[n]o state or Group of States
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state[.]"64
The practice of declining jurisdiction based upon the interests of
another sovereign is, therefore, based in the undergirding legal
principles that serve as the framework for the international legal
order.65 A defining feature of comity, however, is that it is a
discretionary concept rather than a legal obligation.66  In this
netherworld between custom and customary international law, 67 it
is considered "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other."68 Its
place in the legal universe is, at once, ill-defined and entrenched.
61. Paul, supra note 57, at 19.
62. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: AN
INTRODUCTION To THEORY AND HISTORY 166 (7th ed. 2009).
63. Island of Palmas Arbitration (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Huber, J.,
1928).
64. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc A/8082, at
121 (Oct. 24, 1970).
65. Paul, supra note 57, at 38 ("Comity was conceived originally as mutual
respect between sovereigns.").
66. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 136.
67. Id. at 136-37.
68. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
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B. The Rule of Reasonableness
A similar but separate concept which ostensibly serves as a
limit on assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction is what is known as
the "rule of reasonableness." Literature and certain judicial
decisions have recently begun to discuss how international law may
place limitations on jurisdiction - even when otherwise permissible-
based upon notions of reasonableness. According to the
Restatement, even when one of the permissible bases for jurisdiction
is present, "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to a person or activity having connections with another
state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." 69 To
determine whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable, the Restatement counsels that courts should review a
number of factors, including (a) the link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state, (b) the connections between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect, (c) the character of the activity to
be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state,
the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted, (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation, (e) the importance of the
regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system, (g) the extent to which another state
may have an interest in regulating the activity, and (h) the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 70
Under the framework posited by the Restatement, when
reasonable assertions of jurisdiction conflict, each state must
"evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction," and "a state should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater."71 Ryngaert succinctly notes the
implications of the rule reflected in Section 403 in writing that such a
rule would require that when states exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction pursuant to an internationally recognized basis, they
must also go on to conduct an additional "reasonableness analysis"
69. RESTATEMENT § 403(1).
70. Id. § 403(2).
71. Id. § 403(3).
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to determine whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is
permissible.72
In support of this assertion, the comments to the Restatement
assert that "[t]he principle that an exercise of jurisdiction on one of
the bases indicated in Section 402 is nonetheless unlawful if it is
unreasonable is established in United States law, and has emerged
as a principle of international law as well."7 3 The Reporters' Notes
elaborate upon that position vis-A-vis U.S. domestic law:
The courts of the United States have used different formulations
in approaching challenges to the reach of United States
jurisdiction to prescribe. Some courts have addressed the issue
from the point of view of "comity," but seen as a matter of
obligation among states. Other courts have spoken of "due
recognition of our self-regarding respect for the relevant interests
of foreign nations." Courts have invoked the presumption that
Congress does not intend to violate international law, and have
interpreted general words in United States statutes in the light of
"the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the
exercise of their powers." Taken together, these formulations and
variations on them support the principle of reasonableness as well
as the factors set forth in Subsection (2). Congress will not, in
Learned Hand's phrase, be presumed to intend to "punish all
whom [our] courts can catch." 74
Commentators however dispute such assertions and whether a
jurisdictional rule of reasonableness is actually a part of customary
international law.75 An analysis of U.S. jurisprudence on that
subject reveals that even when courts reference such a rule, they are
markedly disinclined to limit jurisdiction in transnational criminal
matters on such grounds. As such, it may fairly be said that no such
rule applies in U.S. law vis-A-vis transnational crime. Even in
regulatory matters, where the rule is more frequently cited in U.S.
jurisprudence, it is couched in terms of comity rather than a
prohibitive rule in international law based on reasonableness.
72. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 142.
73. RESTATEMENT § 403, cmt. a.
74. Id. § 403.
75. RYNGAERT, supra note 28, at 178 ("When States exercise jurisdiction
reasonably, they appear to do so as a matter of discretion, not out of legal
obligation. Reasonableness, if any could be discerned, appears to be 'soft law' that
need not guide future State behavior as a matter of law.").
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VI. Extraterritoriality and the U.S. Legal Framework
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that it interprets U.S.
legislation with the assumption that "Congress generally legislates
with domestic concerns in mind."76 This undergirds "the legal
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have
domestic, not extraterritorial, application."7 7 As this author and
numerous others have noted, however, this general rule is not
without significant exceptions.78
A. The Acceptance of Implied Extraterritoriality
In 1922, the Supreme Court faced the issue of asserting
jurisdiction over conduct that occurred outside the territorial United
States. In United States v. Bowman, the Court considered the case of a
steam boat engineer (Bowman) who conspired to defraud the U.S.
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation under Section 35 of
the U.S. Criminal Code.79 According to the indictment, the plot to
defraud the United States was hatched by Bowman and his
confederates while on board a steamer journeying to Rio de Janeiro.
The overt act that consummated the crime was a wireless telegram
sent from the vessel to certain agents while it was still on the high
seas.80
The sole objection made by the defense in Bowman was that
because the crime was committed on the high seas - closer to Brazil
than the United States - the United States lacked jurisdiction to
prosecute the crime.81 The Supreme Court, however, found that, for
a certain class of crimes, the old rule of presuming a statute had
territorial limitations was inapplicable:
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to
criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on
their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted
because of the right of the government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents. Some such
offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction
76. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993).
77. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005).
78. See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 24, at 3.
79. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95 (1922).
80. Id. at 96.
81. Id. at 96-97.
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of the government because of the local acts required to constitute
them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in
foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not
thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the
locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows
it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.82
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the territorial
presumption does not govern the interpretation of criminal statutes
or statutory schemes which, by their nature, would be greatly
curtailed if limited to domestic application.
Notably, however, the Bowman court obliquely addressed the
issue of a potential conflict with other sovereigns in noting that that
it would be "no offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of
Brazil to hold [the defendants] for this crime against the government
to which the owe allegiance."83 Similarly, with regard to the
defendant who was a subject of Great Britain, the Court noted that
he had not yet been apprehended and that "it will be time enough to
consider what, if any, jurisdiction the District Court has to punish
him when he was brought to trial."84  The Court, therefore,
recognized in some small way the issue of a potential limitation on
jurisdiction based on "the dignity or right of sovereignty" of a
foreign government. As demonstrated below, the question that the
Court then deferred has since been the subject of numerous and
divergent opinions in lower courts. These divergent opinions form
a legal Tower of Babel, all articulating different (sometimes
conflicting) views of the role of international law and limitations on
extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S. domestic law.
B. Structural and Due Process Limitations
Commentators note that the U.S. Constitution imposes both
structural and due process limits on the ability of the U.S. to extend
its laws to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct.85
82. Id. at 98.
83. Id. at 102.
84. Id.
85. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121,
122 (2007).
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Structural limitations refer to the authority of Congress to enact
legislation that has extraterritorial application. Inquiries into
structural limitations focus on the source of authority for the
jurisdictional assertion, such as powers granted in the Offences
Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and
Proper Clause.86 In contrast, due process limitations are not rooted
in Congress's general authority to create laws with extraterritorial
effect, but instead act "to shield the individual accused from the
application of an otherwise constitutional enactment." 87 As the
former of these two categories relates primarily to the organic
authority of the government to enact law, there is little room for
discussion of how international law may permeate its analysis. It is,
therefore, this latter category of limitation that shall be the focus of
this Article.
While no decision of the U.S. Supreme Court has directly
addressed the issue of whether the Due Process Clause limits the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. criminal law,8 8 lower courts have
articulated a number of theories relating to this issue.
C. Prescriptive Comity and U.S. Antitrust Cases
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has delved into the subject of
limitations on the reach of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has
largely been in the context of the limitations imposed by the exercise
of international comity, which is defined as "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws."89 Roberto Iraola notes that international comity is manifested
in two ways: prescriptive comity and "comity of courts." Under
prescriptive comity, courts will construe ambiguous statutes to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations.90 Under the related notion of "comity of courts,"
86. Id. at 124.
87. Id. at 136.
88. A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?,
35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 380 (1997).
89. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164.
90. Roberto Iraola, Jurisdiction, Treaties, and Due Process, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 693, 702
n.41 (2011).
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judges may decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more
appropriately adjudged elsewhere. 91
From almost the very moment when U.S. courts began to
recognize that U.S. antitrust law could apply to conduct occurring
outside of U.S. territory, there was also a recognition of concomitant
restraints on such jurisdictional reaching based on the interests of a
foreign sovereign.92 In the seminal case of United States v. ALCOA,
which found that jurisdiction could be properly exercised over an
agreement based outside of the United States but which had effects
inside the United States, Judge Learned Hand noted that when the
exercise of jurisdiction would give rise to "international
complications," then "it is safe to assume that Congress certainly
did not intend the Act to cover them."93 Such language forms the
protean origin of the rule of reasonableness in U.S. domestic law.
Interestingly, however, such a rule seems to be almost exclusively a
creature of U.S. antitrust jurisprudence. In fact, Ryngaert has traced
the juridical origins of this rule to U.S. antitrust cases and limitations
imposed by U.S. courts on the extraterritorial exercise of U.S.
antitrust legislation.94
U.S. antitrust courts soon qualified the effects doctrine by
requiring direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects.
In spite of this jurisdictional restraint, conflict potential did not
appear to subside. Therefore, toward the end of the 1970s, courts
superimposed another test of jurisdictional restraint. This test
required antitrust courts to inquire 'whether the interests and the
links to the United States - including the magnitude of the effect
on American foreign commerce - are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis
those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
authority."95
A review of key U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law demonstrates the
development of a jurisprudential rule of restraint focused on
alleviating conflicts in commercial affairs.
91. Id.
92. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
93. Id. at 443.
94. RYNGAERT, supra note 29, at 154.
95. Id.
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1. Timberlane: A Lower Court Sets the Stage
In the 1976 case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, the
Ninth Circuit considered the matter of a U.S. partnership
(Timberlane) that imported lumber into the United States from
Central America and sought to expand its operations into
Honduras.96 When Bank of America, which financed much of the
Honduran lumber industry, conspired with Honduran lumber
companies to put Timberlane out of business, Timberlane sued Bank
of America alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2) and the Wilson Tariff Act (15 U.S.C. § 8).
Among the many issues that the Ninth Circuit was called upon to
address in that matter was the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act. In entering into this analysis, the Ninth Circuit stressed the
potential for international discord in applying U.S. law
extraterritorially.
That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation's
borders does not mean that it embraces all, however.
Extraterritorial application is understandably a matter of concern
for the other countries involved. Those nations have sometimes
resented and protested, as excessive intrusions into their own
spheres, broad assertions of authority by American courts.97
Based on such concerns, the court found that even though
jurisdiction could be obtained in cases where there was an effect on
U.S. commerce, the interests of other nations could serve to limit an
otherwise proper extraterritorial extension of U.S. criminal law. In
so holding, the Ninth Circuit found that, beyond the question of
whether the exercise of jurisdiction was cognizable, an additional
analysis "which is unique to the international setting" must be
undertaken in order to determine whether the interests of the
United States in the matter "are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of
other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority."98
The Court concluded that the problem should be addressed using a
three-prong analysis: (1) Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it
intended to affect, U.S. foreign commerce? (2) Is the restraint of a
type and magnitude that it would be a cognizable violation of the
Sherman Act? And (3) As a matter of international comity and
fairness, should extraterritorial jurisdiction be asserted over the
96. 549 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. Id. at 608.
98. Id. at 613.
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matter? 99
Because there was no indication in the record of any conflict
"with the law or policy of the Honduran government, nor any
comprehensive analysis of the relative connections and interests of
Honduras and the United States," the Ninth Circuit found that the
dismissal by the district court cannot be sustained on jurisdictional
grounds.100
Commentators have noted the impact of this decision as it
"introduced a 'comity' analysis to mitigate the impacts of a growing
effects test" and required "that comity considerations be joined with
a finding of direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on foreign
commerce."101 This analysis and its impact, however, would be
curtailed in the subsequent case of Hartford Fire Insurance v.
California.
2. Hartford Fire: Comity and a "True Conflict"
Over a decade later, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, the
Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust
law in a case in which numerous plaintiffs sued London reinsurers,
alleging that they conspired to coerce primary insurers in the U.S. to
offer insurance coverage only if certain changes were made in
insurance forms. 102 The defendants argued that, although the
Sherman Act permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
conduct that produced substantial effects in the U.S., the exercise of
jurisdiction should be declined under the principle of international
comity.103 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected that argument and
held that international comity would not require a declination of
jurisdiction absent "a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law."1 04 As there was no indication that U.K. law prohibited the
defendants from acting in the way required by U.S. law, there was
no conflict and, accordingly, no prohibition on the extraterritorial
99. Id. at 615.
100. Id.
101. S.W. O'Donnell, Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over State Owned
Enterprises and the End of Prudential Prophylactic Judicial Doctrines, 26 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 247, 264 (2003).
102. 509 U.S. 764.
103. Id. at 769.
104. Id. at 798 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)).
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reach of the Sherman Act.105 The majority, therefore, adopted a
rather strict view of international conflict balancing for jurisdictional
purposes - though one which conceived of a potential judicial
moment in which it would be appropriate to decline to exercise
jurisdiction based on the interests of another state.
Justice Scalia, however, in a powerfully worded dissent, urged
that the extension of jurisdiction in such circumstances as presented
in Hartford Fire should be limited by "prescriptive comity," which he
defined as "the respect sovereign nations afford each other by
limiting the reach of their laws."1 0 6 Citing to Section 403 of the
Restatement, Justice Scalia noted, "the practice of using international
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established
in our jurisprudence."107 Proceeding from that analysis, Justice
Scalia argued that the assertion of jurisdiction under the facts of
Hartford Fire should have been considered unreasonable.108 This was
because, in his view, such expansive jurisdictional assertions "will
bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary
conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries - particularly
our closest trading partners." 109 As noted, however, Justice Scalia's
view was a dissenting one and was not adopted.
3. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.: Comity and
Conduct Too Attenuated
Another decade later, in F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd v. Empagran
S.A, the Supreme Court found the judicial moment it anticipated in
Hartford Fire. In F Hoffman-La Roche, the Supreme Court considered
a class action suit brought by foreign and domestic purchasers of
vitamins alleging that certain vitamin manufacturers and
distributors had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy that resulted
in the rise in the price of vitamin products in the United States and
105. Id. at 799 ("Since the London reinsurers do not argue that British law
requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or
claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible,
we see no conflict with British law. We have no need in this litigation to address
other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of
jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.").
106. Id. at 817.
107. Id. at 818.
108. Id. at 820.
109. Id.
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elsewhere.110 The defendants moved to dismiss the suit as to the
foreign purchasers who had, while located abroad, purchased
vitamins outside the United States.111 Finding that the adverse
foreign effect at issue was independent of the adverse domestic
effect, the Court declined to extend the Sherman Act so that it
applied to the foreign purchasers. In so holding, the Court noted
that it "ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations" and that such a rule of construction reflected principles of
customary international law.112
This rule of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of
other nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps
the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together
in harmony - a harmony particularly needed in today's highly
interdependent commercial world.113
The Court, accordingly, found that while U.S. courts have long
held that application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign
anticompetitive conduct was reasonable and consistent with
principles of "prescriptive comity" when seeking to redress
domestic antitrust injuries, it was unreasonable to apply U.S.
antitrust law to conduct "that is significantly foreign insofar as that
conduct causes independent harm and that foreign harm alone gives
rise to [a] plaintiff's claim[.]" 114 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
declined to extend the Sherman Act to a claim by a foreign plaintiff
based wholly on foreign harm.
The holding in F. Hoffman-La Roche is notable for the Court's
emphasis on the unique ability of antitrust laws to impact markets
in foreign countries, stating that "[n]o one denies that America's
antitrust laws, when applied to foreign conduct, can interfere with a
foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own
commercial affairs."115 And, in fact, a key reason for the limitations
articulated in that case was an "insubstantial" justification for such
110. 542 U.S. 155, 160 (2004).
111. Id. at 159-60.
112. Id. at 164.
113. Id. at 164-65.
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 165.
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foreign interference. 116 To support this jurisdictional limitation, the
Court cited to Section 403(2) of the Restatement to support its
finding that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be
reasonable based on "such factors as connections with [the]
regulating nation, harm to that nation's interests, [the] extent to
which other nations regulate, and the potential for conflict."117
What is key in the Court's analysis in F. Hoffman-La Roche and
in each of the cases described above is the focus on commercial
nature of the legislation at issue and the regulation of
anticompetitive conduct. Throughout the analysis in each case,
reference is made to other antitrust cases and one can discern a
limitation in the rule of restraint being articulated and adopted.
Moreover, a defining feature of each of these cases is that they are
civil in nature, requiring the court to define rules relating to
jurisdictional assertions based on actions brought by private parties.
In sharp contradistinction, a review of jurisprudence relating to the
extraterritorial application of criminal law reveals an entirely
different analysis.
VII. Transnational Crime
Professor Anthony J. Colangelo has noted, "the idea that the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause attaches to the extraterritorial
application of federal jurisdiction is of relatively recent vintage."" 8
While no decision of the U.S. Supreme Court has directly addressed
the issue of whether the Due Process Clause limits the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. criminal law,119 lower courts have
articulated a number of theories relating this issue when
determining whether an extraterritorial extension of U.S. criminal
law was proper. As one District Court judge has noted, however,
whether the test for due process requires a sufficient nexus to the
United States, or if it suffices that the prosecution be neither
arbitrary nor capricious is a question that has split the circuits.120
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Colangelo, supra note 85, at 159.
119. Weisburd, supra note 88, at 380.
120. United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2011).
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A. Nexus-based Limitations
1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit first ruled that the extraterritorial application
of U.S. criminal law requires a nexus to the United States in a case
entitled United States v. Peterson.121 In that case, which involved
defendants convicted of possession of a controlled substance in U.S.
customs waters with the intent to distribute and of conspiracy to
destroy goods to prevent seizure, the Ninth Circuit did not expound
upon the topic but succinctly addressed - and rejected - the
argument that the relevant charges constituted an improper and
unconstitutional exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 122 The court
found that "there was more than a sufficient nexus with the United
States to allow the exercise of jurisdiction" because of the evidence
indicating that the drugs were bound for the United States. 123 In
addition, the court held that "drug trafficking may be prevented
under the protective principle of jurisdiction, without any showing
of an actual effect on the United States" because the protective
principle allows for jurisdiction "if the activity threatens the security
or governmental functions of the United States." 124 Finding that
narcotrafficking posed the sort of threat necessary to warrant
application of the protective principle, the court concluded that the
exercise of jurisdiction in that case was proper.125
The issue would receive more extensive treatment only three
years later in the case of United States v. Davis.126 On June 15, 1987, a
Coast Guard cutter encountered a U.K. vessel called the Myth of
Ecurie sailing in waters southwest of California, and heading in the
direction of San Francisco. The Coast Guard suspected the Myth of
smuggling contraband as the Myth was on a list of vessels suspected
of drug smuggling, was sailing in an area in which sailing vessels
were infrequently found, and appeared to be carrying cargo.127 The
Coast Guard then requested permission from the United Kingdom
to board the Myth after informing the British officials of the
121. 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 493-94.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
127. Id. at 247.
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circumstances which led the Coast Guard to believe the Myth
contained contraband material. The United Kingdom thereafter
gave the Coast Guard permission to board the Myth, which, by that
time, had sailed to a location approximately 100 miles west of the
California coast.128 A subsequent search of the vessel revealed over
7,000 pounds of marijuana.129 Davis, the captain of the vessel, was
charged and convicted of possession of, and conspiracy to possess,
marijuana on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
with intent to distribute in violation of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act. 130
On appeal, Davis argued that the provisions of the statute
under which he was convicted, the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 1903(a)-(j)), did not apply to persons
on foreign vessels outside the territory of the United States.13 To
address this contention, the court used a tripartite analytical
framework to determine: (1) whether Congress had constitutional
authority to give extraterritorial effect to the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, (2) whether the Constitution prohibited the
United States from punishing Davis's conduct in this instance, and
(3) whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act applied to the
conduct at issue.132
The first part of this analysis was addressed quickly by the
court, which found that the Constitution authorized Congress to
give extraterritorial effect to the Act because the Constitution gives
Congress the power to "define and punish piracies and felonies on
the high seas[.]"1 33 The court then turned its attention to what
limitations exist on U.S. power to exercise that authority.134
On that second part of the analysis, the court noted that "as a
matter of constitutional law, we require that application of the
statute to the acts in question not violate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment,"135 and that "[i]n order to apply





132. Id. at 248.
133. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 247.
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consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the United States, so that such
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair."136
The Ninth Circuit found that a sufficient nexus existed in that
case so that the exercise of jurisdiction over Davis's extraterritorial
conduct did not violate the Due Process Clause. This was because
the court found that the attempted transaction was designed to
ultimately facilitate criminal conduct in the United States (as Davis
intended to smuggle contraband into U.S. territory).137
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit did not engage in a lengthy
analysis of international law, but noted that prior decisions did
discuss international law jurisdictional principles simultaneously
with the constitutionality of Congress' exercise of jurisdiction. That
practice was eschewed in Davis:
International law principles may be useful as a rough guide of
whether a sufficient nexus exists between the defendant and the
United States so that application of the statute in question would
not violate due process. However, danger exists that emphasis on
international law principles will cause us to lose sight of the
ultimate question: would application of the statute to the
defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?
The Ninth Circuit again addressed the nexus requirement in
United States v. Caicedo. On November 15, 1993, the U.S. Coast
Guard apprehended six foreign nationals on a power boat floating
in the water approximately 200 miles off the coast of Nicaragua and
2,000 miles from San Diego, California.138 The boat was "stateless,"
as it had not registered to any nation, and was not flying any
nation's flag.139 Before being boarded by the Coast Guard, the
defendants jettisoned 2,567 pounds of cocaine, which was recovered
by the Coast Guard, into the ocean. There was no evidence that the
vessel, its cargo or its crew were destined for the United States, or
that any part of the criminal venture occurred in the United States.140
The defendants were charged and convicted of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy.141
136. Id. at 248-49.
137. Id. at 249.
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At trial, the district judge dismissed the complaint, finding that
the government failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus with the
United States and, accordingly, prosecution was "arbitrary and
fundamentally unfair under the Fifth Amendment.142 The appellate
court, however disagreed with this decision and found that Davis
and its progeny were distinguishable as those cases all involved
defendants apprehended on foreign flagged vessels. Per the Ninth
Circuit, "l[t]he radically different treatment afforded to stateless
vessels as a matter of international law convinces us that there is
nothing arbitrary or fundamentally unfair about prosecuting the
defendants in the United States." 143 The court therefore refused to
extend the holding in Davis to cases involving stateless vessel on the
high seas. 144
With regard to a jurisdictional rule of reasonableness, in the
1994 case of United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, the Ninth Circuit
considered the case of certain defendants who were accused of
murdering an American citizen named John Walker, who was living
in Guadalajara, Mexico, while writing a novel, along with his friend
Alberto Radelat, a legal resident of the United States who had
travelled to Guadalajara to visit Walker. 145  In addressing the
challenge made to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in that
case, the court noted that, although an assertion of jurisdiction could
be otherwise proper under international law, an exercise of
jurisdiction "still violates international principles if it is
'unreasonable."' 146
In support of the statement that an exercise of jurisdiction on
one of the permissible bases may still be curtailed if it is
unreasonable, the court cited to Restatement Section 403's comment
a, which states that "the principle that an exercise of jurisdiction on
one of the bases indicated ... is nonetheless unlawful if it is
unreasonable ... has emerged as a principle of international law." 147
This, to the court, posed no obstacle "[bjecause drug smuggling
is a serious and universally condemned offense, no conflict is likely
142. Id.
143. Id. at 372.
144. Id.
145. 15 F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1994).
146. Id. at 840.
147. Id.
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to be created by extraterritorial regulation of drug traffickers."1 4 8
Accordingly, a "universally condemned" offense did not occasion
the sort of conflict that "reasonableness" was designed to mitigate.
Even so, although the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument and allowed for the extension of jurisdiction in that case,
the decision is notable in that the court did articulate the
"reasonableness" test as being a part of the broader extra-
territoriality analysis.
Over a decade later, in United States v. Clark, the Ninth Circuit
considered the case of a defendant who sought to evade criminal
liability by arguing that extraterritorial application of the relevant
statute was unreasonable under Section 403 of the Restatement.149
Noting that the defendant "cites no precedent in which
extraterritorial application was found unreasonable in a similar
situation," and that "Cambodia consented to the United States
taking jurisdiction and nothing suggests that Cambodia objected in
any way to Clark's extradition and trial under U.S. law," the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument and found that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant was reasonable. 150 The court did not,
however, expound upon the rule of reasonableness or how it factors
in to an extraterritoriality analysis.
Ultimately, the role of Section 403 of the Restatement in Ninth
Circuit jurisprudence remains vague and inconstant. Although it is
given a prominent position in the analysis in Vasquez- Velasco, in key
cases such as Davis and Caicedo, it does not appear as a factor in the
analysis at all. It appears in Clark, but without great discussion and
in the context of a failed argument. It is, therefore, extremely
difficult to discern what force the rule of reasonableness may have
in the Ninth Circuit's extraterritoriality analysis in cases of
transnational crime. What is clear from the holding in Clark is that,
even if applicable, there is no history of it serving as a successful
defense in such cases.
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue of whether due
process required a nexus to the United States in the case of United
States v. Yousef, a titan judicial opinion which, within its hundred or
148. Id. at 841.
149. 435 F.3d 1100, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006).
150. Id.
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so pages, manages to touch upon almost every key legal issue
relevant to transnational crime.151 The appeal in Yousef concerned
two different trials - one concerning a conspiracy to bomb U.S.
airliners in Southeast Asia and the other concerning the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. 152
On appeal, some of Yousef's arguments were that the crime of
which he was convicted could not be applied to conduct outside of
the United States, that his prosecution violated customary
international law limiting a nation's ability to criminalize conduct
outside its borders, and that such an application of the law violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.153
Yousef claimed that numerous counts of which he was charged,
which included a plot to bomb a U.S.-flagged aircraft and a count
related to the bombing of a Philippine aircraft traveling outside the
U.S. with no U.S. citizens on board, should be dismissed because
customary international law provided no basis for the exercise of
such jurisdiction. The Second Circuit, however, noted that U.S. law
may apply extraterritorially where Congress has indicated its intent
to give the statute extraterritorial effect154 or where the statute
belongs to that class of statutes that do not logically depend on
locality for their jurisdiction. 155 In addition, while finding that "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains," 156 the court also
noted that Congress can legislate in excess of the limits of
international law if it so desires. 157
The court then, in an expansive analysis, went on to find that
each statute in question applied extraterritorially under U.S. law
and that, in addition, each had a permissible jurisdictional basis
under international law for extraterritorial application.
International law permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction for those
charges relating to a plot to bomb a U.S.-flagged aircraft as they fell
within three bases: the "passive personality" principle (because the
151. 327 F.3d 56 (2003).
152. Id. at 77.
153. Id. at 85.
154. Id. at 86 (citing United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)).
155. Id. (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98).
156. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 21 (1963)).
157. Id. (citing Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 259).
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plot involved U.S. aircraft and persons destined for the United
States), the "objective territoriality" principle (because the purpose
of the attack was to influence U.S. foreign policy and the attack was
intended to have an effect within the United States), and the
"protective principle" (because the planned attacks were intended
to affect U.S. foreign policy).158 Moreover, with respect to the charge
relating to the Philippine airliner outside the United States, the court
found that jurisdiction was permissible under international law as a
result of U.S. obligations under the Montreal Convention as well as
the protective principle because the bombing of the Philippine
aircraft was done as a test-run in furtherance of a plot to attack U.S.
aircraft and influence U.S. foreign policy. 159
With regard to the issue of due process and the requirement of
a nexus to the United States, the court looked to the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Davis which maintained that in order to apply a
federal criminal statute extraterritorially, the Due Process Clause
requires "a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United
States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair."160  Because the facts of the case
demonstrated that the defendants conspired to attack a U.S.-flagged
aircraft "in an effort to inflict injury on this country and its people
and influence American foreign policy," the court found that there
was a "substantial intended effect" on the United States and,
accordingly, a sufficient nexus with the United States so that the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law comported with the
requirements of due process.161
The extraterritoriality analysis detailed by the Second Circuit in
Yousef consists of four-part analytical framework. This framework is
first textual, then contextual, then international, and finally
constitutional. First, the court evaluates the statute in question to
determine if there is an express textual basis for its extraterritorial
application under U.S. law. If there is not, then the court must
undergo a second phase of analysis to determine whether - either
through express language or via "implied extraterritoriality" as
permitted by Bowman and its progeny - the extraterritorial
application of the statute can be inferred. If the statute in question
158. Id. at 97.
159. Id. at 97-98.
160. Id. at 111.
161. Id. at 112.
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requires this second phase of analysis, then the court determines
whether there is a legitimate basis under international law for the
extraterritorial application of the statute.162 This third phase is
required where there is no express language authorizing
extraterritorial application because the court is, at that point,
required to make an interpretive decision as to whether
extraterritoriality can be "implied" and, in such circumstances,
"where legislation is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the
interpretation that does not conflict with 'the law of nations' is
preferred." 163
For the Second Circuit, resort to customary international law is,
thus, only appropriate to the limited extent that there is no treaty, no
controlling executive or legislative act, and no controlling judicial
decision.164 In the absence of positive law, and when required to
make judicial inferences, reference to customary international law is
appropriate. In every case, the court must look to determine
whether a sufficient nexus with the United States exists so that the
statute's extraterritorial application comports with due process. 165
This approach by the Second Circuit has remained constant,
requiring a nexus between the defendant and the United States in
order for the assertion of jurisdiction to satisfy due process. 166 As a
result of this analytical framework, the question of whether or not
an exercise of jurisdiction comports with international law is
disjoined from the question of whether or not a sufficient nexus
exists to make the exercise of jurisdiction constitutionally
permissible. Accordingly, as assertion of jurisdiction could
potentially comport with international law but still fail to satisfy
constitutional due process or vice versa.
With regard to a jurisdictional rule of reasonableness, the
162. Id. at 92 n.26 (noting that the "interpretive canon established by Charming
Betsy does not impinge upon our analysis . because such exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with principles of customary international law." (emphasis added)).
163. Id. at 92.
164. Id.
165. United States v. Al-Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2011).
166. Id. ("When Congress so intends, we apply a statute extraterritorially as long
as doing so does not violate due process. In order to apply extraterritorially a
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be
a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. For non-citizens acting
abroad, a jurisdictional nexus exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm
inside the United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.").
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Second Circuit was clear in Yousef that, although prior cases had
indicated that "Congress may be constrained by a 'reasonableness'
standard in enacting legislation that asserts jurisdiction over
extraterritorial criminal conduct," 67 such cases could be not be read
in such a way as to pose a limitation on the ability of Congress to
extend the jurisdiction of a statute extraterritorially.s6 8 Although a
subsequent decision has mentioned the Restatement in the context
of transnational crime, the circumstances of that case did not require
a deep analysis of its role.169 Subsequent decisions have not even
mentioned the Restatement or a rule of reasonableness. 170
Accordingly, neither the Restatement nor a corresponding rule of
reasonableness has been a factor in the Second Circuit's
extraterritoriality analysis vis-it-vis transnational crime.
3. Fourth Circuit
The key Fourth Circuit case on the issue of extraterritorial
jurisdiction and the requirements of due process is United States v.
Mohammad-Omar.171 There, the Fourth Circuit considered the case of
a defendant convicted of conspiracy to import heroin and
conspiracy to possess heroin.172 The defendant was found guilty of
drug trafficking activity in Afghanistan, Dubai, and Ghana, which
had as its intended goal to transport heroin into the United States.173
On appeal, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the district
court over his case, arguing that prosecution for conduct that
occurred entirely in foreign countries violated the Due Process
Clause.174
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the statutes under
which the defendant was charged applied extraterritorially due to
167. Yousef, 317 F.3d at 109 n.44.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Moreover,
although the Restatement indicates that a nation's exercise of jurisdiction must be
'reasonable,' see Restatement (Third) at § 403 (listing factors to be considered),
Weingarten does not argue that construing § 2423(b) to reach American citizens and
lawful permanent resident aliens acting abroad would be unreasonable under
customary international law.").
170. Al-Kassar, 660 F.3d at 108.
171. 323 Fed. Appx. 259 (2009).
172. Id. at 260.
173. Id. at 262.
174. Id. at 260.
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express language within the statutes prohibiting drug
importation.175 Finding extraterritorial application of the statutes
proper in that regard, the court went on to analyze whether or not
such extraterritorial jurisdiction was constitutional. In this analysis,
the Fourth Circuit looked to the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit
in Yousef and Ninth Circuit in Davis.176
The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that, while Congress
may clearly express its intent to reach extraterritorial conduct, a
due process analysis must be undertaken to ensure the reach of
Congress does not exceed its constitutional grasp. To apply a
federal criminal statute to a criminal extraterritorially without
violating due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the United States so that such application
would not be arbitrary.'77
The court noted that the nexus requirement serves the same
purpose as the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction as it
ensures that a U.S. court will assert jurisdiction only over persons
who should reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in the
United States.178  And in this case, because the evidence
demonstrated that the defendant knew that the illicit drugs he was
trafficking were bound for the United States, a sufficient nexus
existed with the United States to render the exercise of jurisdiction
proper.179
District courts within the Fourth Circuit have maintained this
approach and have elaborated upon its contours and limitations.
For instance, in United States v. Brehm, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia considered the case of a U.S. prosecution
of a South African contractor who, while working for a German
shipping company, stabbed a citizen of the United Kingdom on a
military base in Afghanistan.180  Jurisdiction in this case was
premised on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),
which extends criminal jurisdiction to persons who commit certain
crimes "while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces
175. Id. at 261.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 261-62.
180. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33903 (2011).
2012]1 357
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
outside the United States."181 On appeal, the defendant asserted
that the extension of MEJA to the relevant conduct in this matter
was an unconstitutional grasp at foreign conduct. In rejecting this
assertion, the court noted that the Fourth Circuit and other judicial
circuits have required a "sufficient nexus between the defendant
and the United States, such that the application of the statute would
not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." 182
In an attempt to escape the court's jurisdictional grasp, the
defendant argued that the court should apply the "minimum
contacts" test used in civil matters and its requirement that the
claims against a defendant "arise out of or relate to" his contacts
with the United States. 183 The court, however, while noting that the
"minimum contacts" rule in civil cases served the same purpose as
the "sufficient nexus" rule in criminal matters, refused to conflate
them. Instead, the court enumerated a variety of factors that can be
determinative of a sufficient nexus for due process concerns in
criminal matters:
Courts that have applied this nexus test have considered a wide
range of factors including (1) the defendant's actual contacts with
the United States, including his citizenship or residency; (2) the
location of the acts allegedly giving rise to the alleged offense; (3)
the intended effect a defendant's conduct has on or within the
United States; and (4) the impact on significant United States
interests.184
Notably, the court neither cited the Restatement nor referenced
a "rule of reasonableness" in its analysis; in fact, no court in the
Fourth Circuit has done either of these things in a case centering on
a transnational crime. Instead, the factors and analysis used by the
court were derived from an examination of jurisprudence
articulating what did or did not constitute a sufficient nexus for due
process purposes.185
In this case, the court found that there was a sufficient nexus
with the United States due to defendant's employment, which
provided certain benefits from the United States including access to
the military base; the fact that defendant's conduct impacted U.S.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a).
182. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33903 at *12.
183. Id. at *13.
184. Id. at *14.
185. Id. at *14-15.
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interests and resources because it disrupted the operations on the
military base; and the fact that the defendant had signed an
employment contract that acknowledged he could be subjected to
U.S. criminal law under MEJA.
With regard to the role of international law, the court in Brehm
followed a line of reasoning similar to the Second Circuit and, citing
to Yousef, found that, because of the explicit Congressional language
authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction through MEJA, it was not
necessary to consider whether such an exercise of jurisdiction was
consistent with customary international law.186  The court
nonetheless noted that the exercise of jurisdiction under the facts of
that case was consistent with customary international law,




The First Circuit does not interpret the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to require a nexus between a defendant and
the United States in order for the United States to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant. Rather, for the First
Circuit, the extraterritorial application of a U.S. criminal statute will
not violate due process so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is not
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. Interestingly, in order to
determine whether or not the extraterritorial application of a statute
is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, the First Circuit has held that
the exercise of jurisdiction must comply with the principles of
international law that govern the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.188 Under such an analysis, due process and compliance
with the international law of jurisdiction are coequal.
The First Circuit considered the case of three defendants who
were prosecuted for violations of the MDLEA after their vessel, a
"go fast" boat called the Corsica that was flagged as a Venezuelan
vessel, was intercepted by the Coast Guard in waters roughly 150
miles south of Puerto Rico.189 The Coast Guard, having obtained
186. Id. at *20 n.9.
187. Id.
188. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1999).
189. Id. at 551-52.
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consent from the Venezuela government, boarded and searched the
Corsica. 190 Although they initially found nothing on board, a second
search discovered material that enabled them to link the vessel to
numerous bales of marijuana that had been thrown overboard.
Thereafter, the Venezuelan government confirmed that the vessel
was of Venezuela registry and authorized the arrest and application
of U.S. law to the defendants. 191  Defendants were thereafter
convicted of aiding and abetting each other in the possession of
marijuana on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. 192
On appeal, the defendants argued that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment required the government to prove a nexus
between their criminal conduct and the United States. The First
Circuit, however, disagreed and held that "due process does not
require the government to prove a nexus between a defendant's
criminal conduct and the United States under the MDLEA when the
flag nation has consented to the application of United States law to
the defendants." 193 Instead, rather than requiring a nexus to the
United States, the First Circuit held that "[tlo satisfy due process,
our application of the MDLEA must not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair." 194
In order to determine whether or not the extraterritorial
application of this U.S. criminal statute was "arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair," however, the court found that it must look
to principles of international law relating to extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 195 On that score, the court found that the territorial
principle of international law applied when a state agreed to allow
the law of another state to apply within its territory and that the
protective principle applied to illegal drug trafficking. 196 Both of
these positions are questionable under established principles of
international law. Nonetheless, finding that either the territorial or
protective principles permitted the exercise of jurisdiction under the
facts sub judice, the court found that due process was satisfied. The
190. Id.
191. Id. at 552.
192. Id.
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analysis expressed in the holding is a dense tangle of constitutional
law and international law:
We, therefore, hold that when individuals engage in drug
trafficking aboard a vessel, due process is satisfied when the
foreign nation in which the vessel is registered authorizes the
application of United States law to the persons on board the
vessel. When the foreign flag nation consents to the application
of United States law, jurisdiction attaches under the statutory
requirements of the MDLEA without violation of due process or
the principles of international law because the flag nation's
consent eliminates any concern that the application of United
States law may be arbitrarily or fundamentally unfair. 197
The First Circuit, therefore, has taken the position that
extraterritorial application of this U.S. criminal statute will not
violate due process so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is not
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. Furthermore, such exercise is not
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair so long as it complies with the
principles of international law that govern the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.198
It is important to emphasize that compliance with international
law does not merely form a separate step in such an analysis. To the
contrary, according to this rationale, an exercise of jurisdiction is
considered fair and predictable under the U.S. Constitution
precisely because international law permits it. Rather than serving
as a cynosure, international law takes on a legitimating role that
makes an assertion of jurisdiction constitutionally permissible. The
fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction and the lack of arbitrariness
flow from the compliance with international law. As such, due
process and compliance with the international law of jurisdiction are
deemed practically coequal in that compliance with international
law equates to constitutionality. To comport with international law
is to comport with due process.
Roughly a decade later, in an illuminative dissent, Circuit Judge
Torruella questioned the basis of the First Circuit's longstanding
position, arguing that the First Circuit "erred in Cardales and
subsequent precedent, by assuming due process was satisfied if
international law was satisfied. 199 In Judge Torruella's analysis,
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 576 F.3d 59, 61 (2009) (Torruella, J.,
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"compliance with international law is necessary but not
sufficient." 200  Looking to U.S. jurisprudence governing the
constitutionally permissible exercise of personal jurisdiction, Judge
Torruella urged that due process should serve to limit the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals "absent a nexus
between the seizing State and the seized individual." 201 In his
dissenting view, to comport with international law is necessary, but
is not determinative of whether the defendant would have a
reasonable expectation that he or she might be hauled into a U.S.
court and made the subject of a U.S. criminal proceeding. In that
regard, Judge Torruella argued, "consent of the flag nation, while
relevant to establishing statutory jurisdiction, should not
automatically establish that due process is satisfied." 202 Torruella's
view, accordingly, is that compliance with international law is a
necessary but not altogether dispositive step in the analysis. This
dissenting view, however, has not held sway in the First Circuit.
With regard to the rule of reasonableness, Judge Torruella did
cite to Section 403 of the Restatement in arguing that a nexus should
be required in order for the United States to exercise jurisdiction
over extraterritorial crime.203 But there has been no role for either
that section of the Restatement or the rule of reasonableness in the
analysis articulated by majority opinions of the First Circuit.
2. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis aligns with that of the First
Circuit in that it does not require a nexus but only that the
extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction be neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. This is made apparent in decisions such as
United States v. Ibaruen-Mosquera, wherein the Eleventh Circuit
considered the case of several defendants who were found in a
"semi-submersible vessel" in international waters in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean.204 After being observed for some time by a Maritime
Patrol Aircraft, a Coast Guard ship reached the semi-submersible
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Torruella also notes that the
Cardales opinion's conclusions regarding the protective principle and territorial
principle of jurisdiction are suspect.




204. 634 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 2011).
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vessel and took custody of the defendants, though not before one of
them managed to sabotage the semi-submersible vessel and sink it
in the ocean.205 The defendants were thereafter charged with a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2285, which prohibits
Operat[ing] ... or embarking in any submersible vessel or semi-
submersible vessel that is without nationality and that is
navigating or has navigated into, through, or from waters beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral
limit of that country's territorial sea with an adjacent country,
with the intent to evade detection ....
The defendants, on appeal, challenged the constitutionality of
the statute by arguing, among other things, that it exceeded
congressional power to criminalize this conduct. In rejecting this
argument, the court stated that, in order to give a law extraterritorial
effect, in must not only have a statutory basis for its extraterritorial
application, but must also comport with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 206 To that end, the court - citing to the First
Circuit decision in Cardales - found that "application of the law must
not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." 207 And, in order to
determine whether or not such a law is arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair, the court looked to the bases of jurisdiction under
international law. "In determining whether an extraterritorial law
comports with due process, appellate courts often consult
international law principles such as the objective principle, the
protective principle, or the territorial principle." 208 In that regard,
the court found that because the semi-submersible vessel was
stateless, international law permitted any nation to subject it to its
jurisdiction and, accordingly, as the assertion of jurisdiction
complied with international law, the extraterritorial application of
the statute did not offend due process.209 As with the First Circuit,
compliance with international law translated into constitutionality.
With regard to a jurisdictional rule of reasonableness, the
Eleventh Circuit has referenced Section 403 of the Restatement but
has only done so in one case in which it was treated only with brief
attention and in which the court did not elaborate on the extent, if
205. Id. at 1377.
206. Id. at 1378.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1378-79.
209. Id. at 1379.
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any, of its legal force. In United States v. MacAllister,210 it considered
a case of a defendant who asserted that extraterritorial application
of a statute was unreasonable based on the principles set forth in the
Restatement. In rejecting such an argument, the court merely found
that "[d]rug smuggling is a serious and universally condemned
offense, and therefore, no conflict is likely to be created by
extraterritorial regulation of drug traffickers." 211 Given the absence
of any reliance upon Section 403 of the Restatement or the rule of
reasonableness in any of the subsequent decisions on
extraterritoriality, 212 it is fair to state that neither the Restatement nor
the rule of reasonableness factor largely in the Eleventh Circuit's
extraterritoriality analysis relating to transnational crime.
3. Third Circuit
Third Circuit jurisprudence echoes the rationale of the First
Circuit, though the rule articulated by the Third Circuit is not as
clear and seems to revolve around slightly different core
considerations. The Third Circuit's jurisprudence, which ultimately
adheres to the principle that due process is satisfied so long as the
exercise of jurisdiction is not "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair,"
maintains that a nexus could be required under certain
circumstances, but that no nexus is required in cases relating to
extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes which are universally
condemned. This rationale seems to equate state conflict with
arbitrariness and/or fundamental unfairness.
In United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, the Third Circuit considered
the case of a Columbian national who was arrested in international
waters after the U.S. Coast Guard boarded the vessel and found
eight burlap bags of cocaine. 213 A U.S. naval vessel was in the
course of patrolling the area on the lookout for a drug drop when it
encountered the defendant's vessel - without a flag nor identifying
numbers or name - approximately 80 miles south of Puerto Rico. 214
The Coast Guard asked the flagless vessel's crew what their
nationality was, where they were going, and if they had
210. 160 F.3d 1304, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
211. Id. at 1308.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir.
2011).
213. 993 F.2d 1052, 1053 (3d Cir. 1993).
214. Id.
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documentation.215 After the crew responded by saying that they
were Columbian nationals looking for another boat in distress, the
Coast Guard contacted the Columbian government and obtained a
statement of no objection, boarded the vessel, and found the
cocaine. 216 The defendant, a member of the crew, was subsequently
prosecuted and convicted for possession of cocaine on the high seas
with intent to distribute and conspiracy on the high seas to
distribute cocaine in violation of the MDLEA. 217
On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to
show that he intended that the drugs eventually reach the United
States and, therefore, failed to show a sufficient nexus to the United
States to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over his crime.218 The
court, however, in spite of its prior ruling in Wright-Barker, found
that no nexus to the United States was needed to exercise
jurisdiction because 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d) of the MDLEA "expresses
the necessary congressional intent to override international law to
the extent that international law might require a nexus to the United
States[.]" 219 In so holding, the court specifically declined to follow
the Ninth Circuit's Davis opinion, noting, "we see nothing
fundamentally unfair in applying section 1903 exactly as Congress
intended - extraterritorially without regard for a nexus between a
defendant's conduct and the United States." 220
The critical element that removed the taint of fundamental
unfairness for the Third Circuit was their finding that
narcotrafficking is universally condemned. The court left open the
possibility, however, for a limitation on jurisdiction for crimes that
were not universally condemned:
We, of course, are not suggesting that there is no limitation on
Congress's power to declare that conduct on the high seas is
criminal and is thus subject to prosecution under United States
law. To the contrary, we acknowledge that there might be a due
process problem if Congress provided for the extraterritorial
application of United States law to conduct on the high seas
without regard for domestic nexus if that conduct were generally
215. Id. at 1054.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1053.
218. Id. at 1054-55.
219. Id. at 1056.
220. Id.
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lawful throughout the world. But that is not the situation here. 221
This indicates that, for the Third Circuit, jurisdiction may be
considered improper if there was no nexus and the conduct at issue
was not universally condemned. The addition of universal
condemnation into the analysis, however, overcomes the lack of a
nexus and renders the exercise of jurisdiction proper. The holding
clearly envisions that a nexus could be required under certain
circumstances, but that, in the absence of a nexus, other factors (in
this case, the "universal" condemnation of the offense at issue)
could make a detached exercise of jurisdiction acceptable.
Although the court did not elaborate upon why the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant for a universally condemned crime -
even absent a nexus to the prosecuting state - is not considered
unfair, there are two ways to interpret the holding. The first is that
the exercise of jurisdiction in such circumstances is proper because
the perpetrators of such crimes should anticipate that their
engagement in such activity exposes them to the risk of being
brought before a foreign court due to the universal condemnation of
their activity. 222 The second interpretation is that because the lack of
state conflict in a case involving the prosecution of a universally
condemned crime obviates concerns about competing interests from
other states, because all nations abhor the conduct being pursued,
and, therefore, makes the exercise of jurisdiction neither arbitrary
nor unfair. Neither of these options seems to withstand scrutiny.
As to the first of these potential interpretations, universal
condemnation does not give rise to an assumption of universal
prosecution. Simply because a person commits a crime which is
generally condemned - and many are - this does not necessarily
mean that individual anticipated being prosecuted in a forum with
which he or she has no significant connection. For instance, theft is
widely condemned, yet a thief who steals a purse in the Czech
Republic hardly anticipates being prosecuted for his crime in
Swaziland. Unmoored from the nexus requirement and the
necessity of some connection between the crime and the prosecuting
state, the lone fact that a crime is universally condemned simply
does not provide a logical basis for asserting that an exercise of
jurisdiction lacks arbitrariness.
221. Id.
222. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056.
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As to the second of these possible interpretations, it is an
obvious error to equate a lack of intergovernmental conflict with a
lack of arbitrariness or fundamental unfairness. The two are
separate concerns. While the lack of conflict between states in a
given case may be a basis for finding that there is no reason to
decline jurisdiction based on reasons of comity, it does not mean
that an exercise of jurisdiction is necessarily fair or even foreseeable.
Moreover, such logic would mean that due process hinged on state
protest or consent, so that that citizens of a failed state like Somalia,
which has a very limited presence on the world stage and thus a
limited capacity to protest another government's action, could be
prosecuted for crimes that might be considered to violate due
process were the defendant from a more engaged state.
Constitutional limitations on government action should be rooted in
more constant and egalitarian principles.
Some light was cast on the obscurity of the Third Circuit's
rationale in a 2002 opinion entitled United States v. Perez-Oviedo,
which dealt with the extraterritorial application of the MDLEA. In
that case, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the holding in Martinez-
Hidalgo and found that due process did not prohibit the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the captain of a Panamanian vessel
found in waters north of Trinidad and Tobago laden with cocaine. 223
In finding that due process did not prohibit the exercise of
jurisdiction in such a manner, the court again noted that, since drug
trafficking is "condemned universally by law-abiding nations," the
exercise of jurisdiction over a narcotrafficker apprehended on the
high seas is not fundamentally unfair. 224 While the court offered
nothing illuminative to assist in understanding why this is so, it
did-in addition to the weight given to the general condemnation of
the offense - give emphasis to the fact that the Panamanian
government consented to the search of the vessel.
225 According to
the Court's rationale, "[s]uch consent from the flag nation eliminates
a concern that the application of the MDLEA may be arbitrarily or
fundamentally unfair." 226 This strongly indicates that the Third
Circuit's rationale equates competing state claims with arbitrariness
and/or fundamental unfairness. In spite of any concerns as to the
223. United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 401 (3d Cir. 2002).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 403.
226. Id.
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propriety of such an analysis, it is the prevailing law of that judicial
circuit.227
4. Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Alvarez-Mena,228 the Fifth Circuit considered a
case involving the seizure of a stateless vessel on the high seas, and
the arrest and subsequent prosecution of her alien crew, for
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955(a), a predecessor to the MDLEA. 229
Alvarez-Mena, the defendant, was one of the crew members and
was neither a citizen nor resident of the United States. Alvarez-
Mena moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Specifically, he argued that, even if jurisdiction
was properly exercised over the vessel in rem by virtue of its
stateless status, it was nonetheless improper to assert jurisdiction
over the conduct of the members of her crew who were not U.S.
citizens and not stateless persons. 230
The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected this claim by focusing on
the language of subsection (a) of Section 955(a), which extends
criminal culpability to "any person ... on board a vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas." 23 1 In reading
that expansive language, the Fifth Circuit found that "Congress
anticipated that the act would reach as far as international law
would countenance." 232 In that regard, the court found that the
objective territorial principle of international law provided the
proper basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in this case. 233
Here the legislative history and the wording of the statute clearly
demonstrate Congress's intent to proscribe the specified conduct
of "any person" on a stateless vessel on the high seas without any
U.S. nexus or personal citizenship requirement, as well as
Congress's awareness of the well established rule of international
law that stateless vessels on the high seas may be subjected to the
jurisdiction of any nation. In this situation, in order for us to find
227. It is also worth noting that the Third Circuit has not cited the Restatement
or referenced a "rule of reasonableness" in its extraterritoriality analysis dealing
with transnational crime.
228. 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985).
229. Id. at 1261.
230. Id. at 1265-66.
231. Id. at 1266.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1267 n.11.
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that Congress, out of deference to international law, nevertheless
did intend for there to be some such requirement for a U.S. nexus
or personal citizenship as to persons on stateless vessels on the
high seas, there would have to be a broadly established and well
recognized principle of international law clearly specifying that
the right of nations to subject stateless vessels on the high seas to
their jurisdiction is exclusive of the right to exercise jurisdiction
over the conduct of those aboard such vessels and that jurisdiction
over the conduct of such persons extends no farther than it would
if they were on foreign flag vessels. However, there is no such
principle.234
Accordingly, although the court found no limitation and no
nexus requirement, its analysis of international law was central to its
conclusion. The court went on to note that there may be potential
limits to jurisdictional reach under different facts. 235 The influence
of international law in the court's analysis is, however, apparent.
The analysis clearly indicates that the jurisdictional reach the court
is willing to countenance is that which is coextensive with what
international law allows. 236  While it is true that the decision
identified "the relevance of international law to the problem at hand
is as a reflection of congressional intent rather than as a limitation
on the power of Congress," 237 a canon of construction that finds
Congressional intent will align with international law unless
otherwise stated is, a contrario sensu, a canon of construction
thatgives international law the force of Congressional mandate
unless there is some legislative language to the contrary.
The court then notes that "a broadly established and well
recognized limitation" on jurisdiction would have served as a
limitation had the defendant been capable of demonstrating one -
234. Id. at 1266-67.
235. Id. at 1267 n.11 ("Nevertheless, we observe that we are not faced with a
situation where the interests of the United States are not even arguably potentially
implicated. The present case is not remotely comparable to, for example, the case of
an unregistered small ship owned and manned by Tanzanians sailing from that
nation to Kenya on which a crew member carries a pound of marihuana to give a
relative for his personal consumption in the latter country. It might be inferred that
Congress did not intend to reach so far in section 955a(a) as to cover such a
hypothetical case. The validity of such an inference, however, is by no means
entirely clear.").
236. Id. at 1266.
237. Id.
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which he could not.238 The penetration of international law in the
jurisdictional analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Alvarez-Mena is,
accordingly, significant enough that international legal principles
were determinative of the outcome.
Over a decade later, in United States v. Suerte, the Fifth Circuit
was confronted with the case of a Philippine national who was the
captain of a freighter registered in Malta and owned by a
Columbian/ Venezualan drug trafficking organization.239  The
United States received permission from Malta to board and search
the vessel and, although an initial search did not reveal cocaine,
once Malta waived objection to the enforcement of U.S. law over the
vessel and it was towed to the United States, a subsequent search
revealed evidence of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine (a telex
containing coordinates and a briefcase full of money).240 At trial, the
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that there was an insufficient nexus to the United States to
allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over his conduct.241 The district
court agreed and, finding no nexus existed, dismissed the
indictment.242
The Fifth Circuit approached the constitutional question head-
on in its analysis and found that its jurisprudence indicated that the
only constitutional constraint on the exercise of jurisdiction
pursuant to the MDLEA was found in Article III rather than the Due
Process Clause.243  Exploring caselaw and historic records that
addressed the treatment of the exercise of power under the Piracies
and Felonies Clause of the Constitution, the Fifth Circuit found that
the Fifth Amendment did not impose a nexus requirement on the
reach of statutes criminalizing felonies committed on the high
seas.244
The Fifth Circuit then went on to note, arguendo, that even if
reference to international law principles was required, international
law in this circumstance did not require a nexus to the United States
because "[a] flag nation's consent to a seizure on the high seas
238. Id. at 1266-67.
239. 291 F.3d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2002).
240. Id. at 368.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 369.
244. Id. at 373.
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constitutes a waiver of that nation's rights under international
law."245
Enforcement of the MDLEA in these circumstances is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair (the due process standard
agreed upon by Suerte and the Government). Those subject to its
reach are on notice. In addition to finding "that trafficking in
controlled substances aboard vessels presents a specific threat to
the security and societal well-being of the United States,"
Congress has also found that such activity "is a serious
international problem and is universally condemned." Along this
line, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to which Malta and
the United States are signatories, provides as its purpose: "to
promote cooperation among the Parties so that they may address
more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances having an international
dimension."
Like the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit adopted an analysis that
seems to conflate a lack of conflicts on the international plane with
fundamental fairness. As noted, while such reasons may be reasons
for a court to decline abstaining as a matter of comity, they have
little to do with fundamental fairness or arbitrariness.
It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit expressly stated that
it was not deciding whether the Due Process Clause imposed no
constraints at all upon the extraterritorial application of the
MDLEA- only that it did not impose a nexus requirement. 246 The
court failed, however, to elaborate on what the Due Process Clause
might require. Also notable in the Fifth Circuit's analysis is any
mention of Section 403 of the Restatement and/or the "rule of
reasonableness."
A review of U.S. jurisprudence relating to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, therefore, reveals that courts are disinclined
to limit the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction in transnational
criminal matters and look principally the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution - rather than prescriptive comity or a
jurisdictional rule of reasonableness - to determine whether any
such limitations exist. Moreover, within that subset of cases dealing
with transnational crime, the role of international law differs from
245. Id. at 375.
246. Id.
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even so, international law is a pervasive
presence in almost all such opinions and consistently serves as a
fulcrum in the analysis by which U.S. courts arrive at a conclusion.
VIII. The Penetration of International Law into the
U.S. Domestic Law of Extraterritorial
A. Jurisdiction
As noted, the role of international law in U.S. jurisprudence
addressing extraterritorial jurisdiction differs depending on the
nature of the law in question. In regulatory matters, the United
States will base limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction on notions
of comity while, for transnational criminal matters, courts will apply
limitations mostly commonly associated with the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, though suffused with international
legal considerations. An analysis of each varied approach in U.S.
jurisprudence illuminates key areas where international law and
U.S. domestic law converge, specifically with regard to the manner
in which each empowers or limits the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
law.
1. Civil Antitrust Cases and Comity
The defining feature of the extraterritorial analysis used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the series of civil antitrust cases it has
addressed is its emphasis on the use of comity as a means to limit
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In a series of holdings,
the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed subordinate courts on when
it is appropriate to refuse to exercise jurisdiction based on a matter
of international comity and the competing interests of another
sovereign. Although the Court indicated in Hartford Fire that
international comity would not require a declination of jurisdiction
absent "a true conflict between domestic and foreign law,"247 it has
also held in F. Hoffman-La Roche that it was unreasonable to apply
U.S. antitrust law to conduct "that is significantly foreign insofar as
that conduct causes independent harm and that foreign harm alone
gives rise to [a] plaintiff's claim[.]" 248 Again, the basis for such a
demurral was the desire to avoid infringing on the interests of other
sovereigns. On that score, in its most recent pronouncement on the
247. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 765 (quoting Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 555).
248. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 166.
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topic, the Court stated that it "ordinarily construes ambiguous
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations" and that such a rule of construction
reflected principles of customary international law.249 Similarly, the
Supreme Court is routinely reliant on Section 403 of the Restatement
and concerns of "reasonableness" in formulating its basis for
demurring where U.S. interests are too attenuated 250 -
demonstrating in clear terms the way in which international law has
permeated judicial reasoning in such matters.
B. Transnational Crime: The Nexus Requirement versus the Focus
on Fairness
With regard to crimes that do not focus on market-regulating
activity, a notable difference is the comparatively scant weight
allotted by lower courts to considerations of "reasonableness"
and/or in Section 403 of the Restatement. A review of U.S.
jurisprudence relating to transnational crime finds few mentions of
this rule at all - and what few mentions are found are typically in
the context of a failed argument by a defendant over whom the
court is finding a basis for jurisdiction. Limitations on
extraterritorial jurisdiction in transnational criminal matters are
mostly commonly rooted in the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. In that regard, U.S. law relating to the extraterritorial
application of criminal statutes typically falls within one of two
categories: (a) those districts which require a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and the United States so that due process is
not violated; and (b) those districts which require only that the
assertion of jurisdiction be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.
1. International Law and Nexus-Based Limitations
The discussion above illustrates that, in those cases where
Congress has expressly stated that a statute should apply
extraterritorially, courts maintaining nexus-based limitations based
on due process have used the customary international law of
jurisdiction as a measuring stick for the sufficiency of a nexus.
Where, however, extraterritoriality must be implied, such courts
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jurisdiction is required.
As a general matter, in the analysis used by courts maintaining
nexus-based limitations on extraterritoriality, the role of
international law has been notably secondary. While the Ninth
Circuit in Davis noted that international law principles can serve as
a rough guide to determining the sufficiency of a jurisdictional
nexus, it cautioned against overemphasizing international law
principles at the risk of neglecting "the ultimate question" of
whether the application of the statute to the defendant would be be
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.251 The Second Circuit in Yousef
was equally emphatic that "United States law is not subordinate to
customary international law or necessarily subordinate to treaty-
based international law and, in fact, may conflict with both."252
Yet, as has been illustrated, courts adhering to this view still
maintain that the customary international law of jurisdiction plays a
central role in situations where the extraterritorial application of a
statute is to be inferred. In such circumstances, courts must still
ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with a recognized
basis under international law because "where legislation is
susceptible to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that does
not conflict with "the law of nations" is preferred." 253 As such,
international law has been expressly incorporated in the analysis
used by courts maintaining the need for nexus-based limitations on
extraterritorial jurisdiction, guided national courts in making
determinations on the constitutionality of a jurisdictional claim of
legislation that expressly applies extraterritorially, and served as a
hard limitation where extraterritoriality must be implied.
2. International Law and Fairness-Based Limitations
For other courts, the extraterritorial application of this U.S.
criminal statute does not require a nexus between the defendant and
the United States. According to this view, a statute will not violate
due process so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is not arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair. But, for those courts adopting a fairness-
based analysis, international law has played a larger role than in the
"nexus" analysis. For instance, the First Circuit has held that, in
order to determine whether a statute is arbitrary or fundamentally
251. 905 F.2d at 248-49.
252. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91.
253. Id. at 92 n.26.
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unfair (the central query in the analysis of its constitutionality), it
will look to the principles of international law which govern the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 254 - positing a rule that
suggests that due process and compliance with the international law
of jurisdiction are practically coequal in that compliance with an
internationally recognized basis of jurisdiction equates to a
constitutionally permissible exercise of state authority. Similarly,
the Eleventh Circuit has expressly looked to international law
principles in determining whether an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law comports with due process.255
One may debate the question of whether or not these courts
intended to impart to international law such primacy or whether
international law merely served as a convenient tool to attain a
desired result in otherwise difficult cases - providing a convenient
rationale to justify the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct. If this line of reasoning merely represents
an exercise in legal instrumentalism to attain a desired result, then
its logic will likely prove to be ephemeral and its underlying
principles will yield should its implications become inconvenient or
uncomfortable. If, however, the language of these opinions proves
durable, then the result is the placement of international law in a
position of great consequence within the U.S. domestic legal order.
The Third Circuit, which departs from other courts of this
school in important regards, has found that due process will not
limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law - even
absent a nexus to the United States - in situations where the
criminalized conduct is "generally lawful throughout the world," 256
thus arguably allowing for universal jurisdiction to create the basis
for an appropriate exercise of jurisdiction under U.S. law. The Fifth
Circuit has adopted a rationale which seems to echo this line of
reasoning, though both judicial circuits have used language
indicating that due process may limit extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the right circumstances and when the link between the
United States and the relevant conduct is sufficiently attenuated.
254. Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553.
255. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d at 1378-79.
256. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056.
2012] 375
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
IX. Conclusion
International law and domestic national law are autonomous,
but interdependent, legal orders. 257 As domestic national law does
not provide an adequate framework for the regulation of
transnational issues, 258 and as the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction can be conflict generative, U.S. domestic courts have
developed rules to avoid inappropriate extensions of jurisdiction.
As this Article has demonstrated, the nature of the demurral
mechanism used to avoid excessive jurisdictional claims will
depend on the nature of the case before the court and the judicial
district in which the case is tried. An analysis of each varied
approach in U.S. jurisprudence illuminates key areas where
international law and U.S. domestic law converge, specifically with
regard to the manner in which each empowers or limits the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. law.
A. Different (and Inapposite) Rationales
The most marked dichotomy in U.S. jurisprudence with regard
to limitations on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that
which exists between cases dealing with regulatory legal regimes
and those dealing with transnational crime. The cases in which the
Court has counseled and exercised limitations based on the
sovereign interests of other nations have been exclusively antitrust
cases arising in the context of civil litigation and were unwaveringly
focused on a desire to keep "the potentially conflicting laws of
different nations work together in harmony" 259 in commercial
matters. Such limitations, however, have not been articulated in the
context of other sorts of legal regimes that do not focus on market-
regulating activity, nor have subordinate U.S. courts adhered to
such an analysis. In U.S. jurisprudence, transnational crime has
been treated differently.
Although the rationale for this disparate analytical treatment
has not been expounded upon by the Supreme Court, the analysis
257. NOLLKAEMPER, Supra note 6, at 13.
258. Id. at 2.
259. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (noting that legal harmony is
"particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.").
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above demonstrates its existence and further reflection upon the
differences in the sorts of legislation subject to regulation allows
observers to discern its rationale - a rationale which can be
justifiably grounded in the very obvious differences between civil
actions involving U.S. antitrust law and criminal statutes that take
on a transnational focus.
1. The Civil-Criminal Divide
At the outset, there is a significant difference between civil and
criminal law in both purpose and effect. Civil law, as a general
matter, is concerned with "civil or private rights and remedies, as
contrasted with criminal laws."260 Criminal law, in turn "is an
institution by which the state prohibits certain types of conduct and
punishes persons who violate those prohibitions." 261 The former
concerns private litigants seeking to use the law to bring each other
into conformance with a preferred course of conduct dictated, at
least in part, by private interests while the latter concerns the state
using its sovereign authority to punish a transgressor. While both
can involve sanctions of a type, as one commentator succinctly
noted, "Criminal liability is diferent - importantly dissimilar from
other kinds of legal sanctions" 262 due to the resonating stigma of a
criminal conviction versus a civil fine or injunction. U.S.
jurisprudence has recognized this distinction and, accordingly,
cautioned against using the extraterritoriality analysis of civil and
criminal cases interchangeably. 263
The disparate analyses for disparate laws is highlighted in the
recent Supreme Court case of Morrison v. Nat'! Australia Bank, Ltd.,
260. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 ("civil law").
261. A.P. Simester & Stephen Shute, On the General Part in Criminal Law in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 4 (Shute & A.P. Simester
eds., 2002).
262. Douglas N. Husak, Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of
Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 23
(Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("Nothing in Sale and Arabian Oil Co. compels the conclusion that [a statute]
applies only domestically. Those decisions involved very different statutes.");
United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2011) (distinguishing
the recent case of Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010),
which limits the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from
the proper extraterritoriality analysis in criminal matters, noting that "recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with nary a mention of Bowman and
has predominately involved civil statutes.").
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which limits the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The Morrison opinion unwaveringly focuses on the
overseas applicability of specific civil legislation, 264 and, in
discussing the extraterritorial applicability of that statute, makes
absolutely no mention of its prior decision in Bowman and the
extensive progeny of that criminal case in the lower courts. Such
cases, which address extraterritorial application of criminal statutes,
are not part of the Court's analysis as that criminal law analysis has
become so separate as to be inapposite to civil litigation. Lending
additional force to this restrictive view of Morrison is that the
analysis in the decision focuses on the Restatement, which
specifically sets forth the bases for jurisdiction to regulate "activities
related to securities" rather than Section 402. This case, accordingly,
serves to emphasize the civil-criminal divide.
Given this distinction, there is a certain fundamental logic to
showing greater caution in extending the reach of U.S. law for a
matter involving a private litigant in a civil matter who wishes to
use U.S. law in a way that may result in some abrasion between
sovereigns. This is because such actions are, in a sense, uncontrolled
and dependent entirely upon private parties pursuing private
interests. By contrast, a criminal action in the United States is one
being brought by the government (at some level) in order to punish
an individual for a transgression so severe that a legislative body
has seen fit to enact law making it a crime. The multiplicity of U.S.
jurisdictions notwithstanding, the inherently governmental aspect of
a criminal prosecution makes extraterritorial extensions of U.S. law
more controlled and ensures that any international discord
occasioned by such action has been, at the very least, occasioned by
a purposive government actor rather than a private participant who
has drug the government into an international conflict unwittingly.
2. The Mala In Se-Mala Prohibita Continuum
Another difference between regulatory legal regimes and
transnational criminal law lies in the particular point on which
regulatory law - such as antitrust legislation - is located on the
ideological continuum between mala prohibita and mala in se
offenses. 265 Antitrust cases are more likely to be classified as mala
264. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869.
265. A.P. Simester & Stephen Shute, On the General Part in Criminal Law in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 10-11 (Stephen Shute &
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prohibita as, even when appearing in the criminal context, they are
essentially regulatory266 in nature and address conduct which is not
"pre-legally wrong" - as opposed to other offenses such as terrorism
and narcotrafficking which are more closely aligned with that
category of inherently wrongful conduct. This is because, at the
core, antitrust law exists to encourage competition and prohibit anti-
competitive behavior and unfair business practices in the
commercial marketplace. 267 Engaging in anticompetitive business
practices - even if labeled a criminal offense - is a qualitatively
different sort of offense from, for instance, an act of international
terrorism in that international terrorism poses more danger to the
sovereign and its citizenry. As such, a sovereign's need to pursue
an offense such as an act of terrorism will more likely outweigh any
potential conflict with another sovereign that the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law might occasion. Otherwise stated, mala in se
crimes can logically be afforded greater extraterritorial reach than
mala prohibita crimes as the state's need to pursue the former
category is naturally greater. On that score, a number of serious
crimes such as narcotrafficking, 268 terrorism, 269 money laundering,270
and corruption 271 are the subject of various multilateral conventions
A.P. Simester eds., 2002).
266. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 249 (2006) ("As the term is generally used, 'regulatory crime'
refers to a collection of penal statutes applying to a wide array of matters within the
purview of federal, state, and local administrative agencies, including the
environment, product and workplace safety, labor, banking, securities, antitrust,
transportation, trade, taxation, immigration, customs, agriculture, education, health
care, and housing.").
267. See generally KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION (2003).
268. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, art. 17, 28 I.L.M. 493, 520; Convention
for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, June 26, 1936, 198
L.N.T.S. 299.
269. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, S. Treaty Doc. No.106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-49, 39 I.L.M. 268; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, open
for signature Sept. 14, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 815.
270. See, e.g., The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure,
and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ETS No. 141 (entered into force 1993).
271. See, e.g., Convention Against Corruption, U.N. GAOR 57th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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which require all states to criminalize and suppress such conduct
and, therefore, would logically not be appropriately limited by a
court for the sake of avoiding international discord. There is,
therefore, a logical and supportable rationale for the dichotomy in
U.S. jurisprudence with regard to laws that impact commercial
markets and criminal matters that do not have such market-
impacting qualities.
B. Preferred Approach for Transnational Crime?
There a degree of conceptual overlap among the competing
rationales the lower courts have adopted in exploring limitations on
extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational crime. There is, to be
sure, a consonance in the rationales of those courts requiring a nexus
to the United States in order for jurisdiction to be appropriate and
those courts which, while not requiring a nexus, demand that the
exercise of jurisdiction be fundamentally fair, lack arbitrariness, and
which look to the customary international law of jurisdiction to
gauge whether that standard has been met. This is because, in most
cases, the customary international law of jurisdiction presupposes a
nexus.
The permissive principles of jurisdiction are entwined in that they
all put forward a link between the situation they govern and the
competence of the State. This link is not necessarily the territory.
It can as well be one of the two other constituent elements of the
definition of a State, namely its population or its sovereign
authority.272
The international law of jurisdiction, therefore, typically
envisions some linkage between the prosecuting state and the
person being prosecuted - even if it is an abstract linkage - in order
for jurisdiction to be permissible. As such, in most cases where
extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to one of the
recognized bases under international law, a nexus between the
criminal and the prosecuting state exists. As a result, an analysis
which eschews a nexus requirement - yet looks to customary
international law to determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is
fair - is still achieving connectivity by looking to a body of law
which envisions the existence of a link between the prosecuting state
and the criminal or his/her activity. The analysis merely finds its
A/58/422 (Dec. 14, 2005).
272. RYNGAERT, supra note 29, at 31.
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nexus through international legal principles. For this reason,
conflating "fundamental fairness" with customary international law
typically produces the same result as requiring a nexus as a part of
the due process analysis. The inherent nexus in international law
provides an adequate link in most circumstances to make an
exercise of jurisdiction fundamentally fair.
The rationale, however, grows hoarse and true differences in
the approaches become emphasized when courts base the "fairness"
of a jurisdictional claim on universal jurisdiction - a theory of
jurisdiction which allows a court to be seized of a matter "without
reference to the place of perpetration, the nationality of the suspect
or victim or any other recognized linking point between the crime
and the prosecuting State." 273 Under such circumstances, there is
not necessarily a link of any sort between the prosecuting state and
the criminal and his/her activity and the inherent link normally
achieved by looking to customary international law dissipates. With
that dissipation, the adequacy of international law as a basis for
satisfying constitutional requirements of due process becomes more
questionable. If due process should serve to provide a defendant
with a reasonable expectation that he or she might be haled into a
U.S. court and made the subject of a U.S. criminal proceeding, it
seems an error to conflate those ideas associated with fundamental
fairness and the lack of arbitrariness with a jurisdictional basis
unmoored from any link to any specific place or government. This
danger is only exacerbated when courts broaden the scope of
universal jurisdiction so that it applies not only to jus cogens crimes
but also to conduct that is generally condemned throughout the
world. 274 The reliance on international law in such a way raises the
concerns expressed by Judge Torruella in United States v. Angulo-
Hernandez: "[C]ompliance with international law is necessary but
not sufficient." 275
C. Final Remarks
The subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction is a vortex on the legal
plane in which domestic law and international law swirl alongside
delicate policy considerations related to international affairs. The
273. CRYER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50-51.
274. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056.
275. Angulo-Hernandez, 576 F.3d at 62 (Torruella, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
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analysis above demonstrates the textured and complex nature of
this area of the law. From the ancient doctrine of comity,
particularly as applied in civil regulatory matters, to reliance upon
customary international law in transnational criminal matters, it
remains true that that international law plays a critical role in the
U.S. of extraterritorial jurisdiction and that, just as much as when
the words were penned at the dawn of the last century,
"[i]nternational law is part of our law[.]" 276 Whatever the facts,
though distinct differences in analysis prevail, international law
factors as a critical element in U.S. judicial decisionmaking vis-A-vis
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In addition, the analysis demonstrates the variety of approaches
adopted in U.S. jurisprudence in limiting the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. domestic law and, thereby, assuaging potential conflicts that
can be occasioned by such juridical projections of power. In
exploring the varying approaches, it is evident that the
jurisprudence surrounding limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction
is something of a juridical Tower of Babel. Some of that difference is
due to differences in the nature of the laws under consideration, and
the natural lack of legal interoperability resulting from a necessary
variance in approach with regard to, for instance, civil antitrust
matters. Some of the confusion - especially with regard to those
decisions dealing with transnational crime - is, however, simply the
result of a lack of uniformity in approach among the lower courts
and a lack of a clarifying voice from the Supreme Court.
With so many courts speaking a different legal language and
espousing so many conflicting views, U.S. domestic law regarding
limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction is fractured. Nonetheless, some
hope for resolution may be found as the analysis also illuminates a
number of similarities in these seemingly different approaches. By
understanding the role international law plays in each of these
analyses, the similarities of the undergirding rationales, as well as
the differences and potential dangers, policymakers and legal actors
can work to clarify this discordant and fractured legal landscape
and articulate a unified view of international law and limitations on
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S. domestic law.
276. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
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